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The United Nations and the
Challenge of the Post-Cold War
World
Donald J. Puchala, University of South Carolina
In the conclusion to our 1989 report to the Academic Council on
the United Nations System on the state of the UN, Professor Roger
Coate and I questioned the continuing relevance of a world organization
chartered in 1945 and focused programmatically on preventing a
recurrence of conditions that caused World War 11.1 Structurally, the
UN had not evolved as world conditions changed during a half century,
and we therefore wondered whether the organization was capable of
usefully dealing with the international issues of the late 20th Century
and beyond.
Our skepticism was fueled by two observations:
first, the
sensitivity, creativity and practical effectiveness of the United Nations
are all constrained by its intergovernmental character. The UN remains
an organization of states, a club where governments meet, and this
dramatically affects what it can and cannot do in important policy
realms. Second, the United Nations is a global organization, and its
agenda perforce focuses on global problems. While it is true that
mankind does have a number of common problems, not least among
them insuring survival by controlling nuclear weapons, it is also the
case today that regional, national and local problems are the most
urgent. The United Nations however, is not well-equipped to work
below the global level either conceptually or practically.
The challenge for the United Nations today, and therefore the
starting point for any serious discussion of UN reform, is how to stay
relevant as an intergovernmental, global organization in a world where
multilateral interactions among national governments are not
appropriate approaches to many pressing problems, and where the
An earlier version of this essay was presented at the conference on "A
New World Order and the Reform of the United Nations ," Kyung Hee
University, Seoul, Korea, September 21-22, 1993.
1Donald J. Puchala and Roger A. Coate, The Challenge of Relevance :
The United Nations in a Changing World Environment (Dartmouth, NH :
The Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1989). While this
essay proceeds from collaborative efforts between Coate and Puchala,
perspectives and conclusions presented here are Puchala's alone.
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majority of global issues, whatever their rhetorical worth, are mostly of
marginal practical concern. Reforming the United Nations, therefore,
ought to be an exercise in identifying and maximizing the
Organization's comparative advantages as a policy instrument for the
international community. The UN ought to do more of what it does
best as an intergovernmental, global organization, and it ought to exit
policy realms where its intergovernmental structure and global
orientation render it less than effective.

The UN in the Peacekeeping Niche
UN-styled intergovemmentalism still finds an apparent niche in the
post-Cold War environment in the area of peacekeeping and its policy
progeny, peacemaking and peacebuilding. While serious questions need
to be raised about the efficacy of UN armed interventions into regional
and national conflicts, such activities are being rendered imperative by
post-cold war international conditions. If the first few years of the postCold War era are indicative of world affairs to come, we may
realistically expect recurrent future conflict based upon reasserted claims
for national, ethnic and religious autonomy. It is hardly necessary to
rehearse how cold war political and ideological conformities, voluntary
and enforced, suppressed ethnic tensions, how the superpowers
controlled their clients and subdued conflicts among them, how fear and
favors muted within-bloc rivalries and how allied elites supported by
Washington or Moscow owed their tenure to setting bloc interests
above national aspirations. Almost all of this is now over, and the
result is proliferating, nationalistically-kindled disorder. Added to this
is the congeries of continuing conflicts -- in Palestine, Somalia,
Cambodia, Southern Africa, Nicaragua, Kashmir, Afghanistan and
elsewhere -- that have carried over from the cold war era. There are also
numerous simmering issues about borders in the Persian Gulf region,
islands in the China Sea, water and riparian rivalries and stalemates in
still-divided countries. While these post-cold war conflicts immediately
threaten only those parties directly involved, many of them have
escalatory potential and thus threaten more widely. Even as localized
contests, they destroy lives, undermine livelihoods , lay waste to
property and belie any image of peace prevailing at Francis Fukuyama's
"end of history."2
For the moment, and into the foreseeable future, the UN is
uniquely available for such peacekeeping assignments . Peacemaking
and peacekeeping as established under Chapters VI and VII of the

2Francis Fukuyama , "The End of History ?" The Na1ional Interest 16
(Summer, 1989), pp. 3-18.
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Charter are in fact the principal raison d'etre for the UN of the early 21st
Century.
Ironically, the ending of the Cold War not only unleashed the
disorders of our day, but it also presented the status quo powers with an
enhanced means for dealing with them. The termination of East-West
rivalry allowed the invigoration of the United Nations Security Council
because the five permanent members were able, for the first time since
the UN's founding, to consistently cooperate. Actions under Chapter
VII of the Charter therefore became possible, and indeed have been
engaged in the Gulf War and in the former Yugoslavia. In addition,
because in the post-cold war era the Secretary-General of the United
Nations has been able to count upon the strong, consistent support of
the Security Council, actions under Chapter VI of the Charter, having
to do with good offices, fact-finding and impartial third-party mediation,
have also become more authoritative and quite effective, particularly in
instances like the political settlement brokered by the United Nations in
El Salvador and in aspects of the political reconstruction of Cambodia.
Overall, the UN's capacities for peacekeeping and peacemaking have
been significantly strengthened precisely at the historical moment when
there is increased need for such capacities.
Among international agencies that could conceivably perform the
peacekeeping/ peacemaking function, the United Nations is best
qualified. It is the only political organization with military capability
that can claim to represent the entire international community. While
there is much that is fictitious about this claim, since UN peacekeeping
actually represents a consensus only of the Security Council and more
particularly of its five permanent members, allowing the fiction to
stand legitimizes UN interventions on grounds that no other agency can
claim -- i.e., action in the name of the international community. On
these grounds, the UN is a more acceptable intervenor, in non-Western
areas especially, than anyone else. Equally, important, over many years
the United Nations has accumulated a significant amount of experience
at intervening as peacemaker and peacekeeper . This is certainly true
with regard to various kinds of armed interventions, of which there have
been dozens under UN auspices. 3 What is less well recognized, but
highly noteworthy, is that there have also been hundreds of UN
interventions as mediator, arbitrator, impartial third-party, conciliator
and adjudicator, and considerable valuable experience has accumulated in
this realm as well. 4 There has traditionally been a distinguished corps
of peacemaking and peacekeeping professionals aiding the Secrtetary3

Unit ed Nations, The Blue Helmets : A Review of United Nations
Peacekeeping (New York: The United Nations, 2nd edition, 1990).
4 K. Venkata Raman (ed.) Dispute Settlemenl Through the United Nations
(UNITAR, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1977), passim.
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General, a group that George Sherry identifies as "the second UN." 5
They are the best in the world at what they do. In recent years
particularly, the UN membership has been willing to allow the
Organization additional resources to engage in peacekeeping and
peacemaking (though these remain woefully inadequate) and the most
powerful countries in the world have been willing to allow the UN, via
the Security Council, to assume leadership in peacemaking and
peacekeeping to an historically unprecendented degree. No other agency
has the legitimacy, the expertise, the resources or the mandate for
peacemaking and peacekeeping today held by the UN; the world
organization remains uniquely positioned to meet international needs.
One important reason why UN peacekeeping has been and can
continue to be successful is because it involves activities that are not
seriously hampered by the intergovernmental character of the
Organization. They are activities that the United Nations, as presently
structured , can conduct in a multilateral, political-diplomatic context
where all relevant participants are the agents of governments of
sovereign states. On peace and security questions, traditionally trained
and socialized diplomats, representing foreign ministries, calculating in
terms of perceived national interest defined largely as position, power or
prestige , are the principal interlocutors. National governments are the
primary targets (and beneficiaries) of peacekeeping operations. These
operations are facilitated by the structure of power among states, and the
major powers, acting in their own self-interests, using the UN, initiate
peacekeeping and take and accept responsibility for it. Traditional UN
peacekeeping only minimally involves non-governmental organizations
or transnational ones, and it requires not even a modicum of
supranationality to initiate or execute. It calls up no technical expertise
that diplomats or soldiers do not already bring to their professions.
In addition, without understating the significance of the traditional
accomplishments of the United Nations in peacekeeping, it should be
noted that, in terms of UN policy-making, peacekeeping matters have
not been very complex. The traditional mode of UN military
intervention is into international conflicts where fighting has already
been halted, and where ceasefires or armistices need to be impartially
monitored. Here the United Nations typically inserts itself, or, more
accurately , the Security Council inserts UN-recruited military forces ,
between antagonists to deter provocations and insure compliance with
hostility-halting agreements.
Notably, most of these situations involve a relatively small
number of semi-autonomous participants; most of the communications
and involvements of personnel intergovernmental ; most of the required
5 George

L. Sherry, "The United Nations, International Conflict and
American Security ," Political Science Quarterly , 101:5 (1986), pp . 753771.
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national inputs come from single or closely inter-related ministries
(e.g.,foreign affairs and defense), relatively few UN organs are directly
involved, and these are typically among the bureaucratically most
efficient ones. Overall, in favorable political contexts, a formal
intergovernmental organization like the United Nations should be able
to manage the kinds of issues and problems that traditional
peacekeeping presents, and, with a very few exceptions, the UN has
been quite good at peacekeeping. There is no obvious reason why the
UN should not continue to be a most useful instrument for
peacekeeping in the traditional mode here described.
But today the challenge confronting the United Nations in
promoting peace and security is that many of the conflicts into which it
is being injected require mounting operations that do not fit the model
of traditional peacekeeping. For one thing, the kinds of situations into
which the UN is typically being asked to intervene in the post-Cold
War Era fall into operational "grey areas" between traditional
impositions to separate warring parties and full-scale military
enforcement against aggressors. UN interventions are projections into
countries rather than interpositions between them, because small- and
large-scale, intercommunal civil wars seem to be emerging as the most
frequently recurring threat to world peace. Formally, the international
legality of such United Nations interventions remains ambiguous under
the United Nations Charter where Chapter I proscribes intervention "in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state," but Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to "determine
the existence of any threat to the peace," and "decide what measures
should be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and
security."
In practice, the Security Council has already chosen to broaden the
allowable range of UN intervention, and even to define humanitarian
crises, as in Somalia, as threats to peace that may entitle the
international community to go into countries uninvited. In extreme
cases of anarchy, such as Somalia became in 1992 and other African
countries could shortly become, the United Nations confronts the
problem of having no national government to deal with at all. Along
with this come the legalities and practicalities of relating as an
intergovernmental international organization to nonsovereign entities of
unknown legitimacy, capability, dependability and responsibility.
Complicating such situations is the reality that anarchies almost always
contain multiple contending entities so that it is rarely possible Lofind
only two sides in conflict. Here it is usually fanciful to try to identify
aggressors, and especially difficult to maintain impartiality.
Complicating contemporary UN interventions, and moving them
even farther in form from traditional peacekeeping is the fact that many
situations nowadays require United Nations entrance while armed
Volume 22, 1994 I 133

Donald Puchala
hostilities are ongoing. While the UN typically does not "go in
shooting," it more and more frequently "goes in getting shot at." Such
interventions therefore are neither armistice monitorings, as in Cyprus,
nor combat operations, as during the Gulf War: they are a variety of
things in between and they necessitate preparations, deployments and
armaments fundamentally different from those of the past. Blue
helmets, checklists, checkpoints, white jeeps and inconspicuous, light
sidearms will no longer do.
Interventions today are also much more complex than those of the
past: they often have humanitarian as well as military dimensions;
they require civilian as well as military personnel; and they involve
delicate balancings between military measures aimed at halting or
deterring hostilities and diplomatic measures aimed at resolving
conflicts.
The only UN military intervention in the past that
approached the present norm of complexity was the Congo Operation,
and most agree, by hindsight, that this experience for the UN was
disappointing. 6
If the United Nations is to remain relevant and promising as the
international peacekeeper of the early 21st century, important
conceptual actitivities need to be engaged. The new circumstances
surrounding UN military interventions, and particularly how they differ
from traditional peacekeeping, have to be better understood both by
those who would direct the United Nations to intervene , and by those
who will implement the directions. Appropriate ends, means and
missions have to be mapped for UN action in situations that are neither
traditional peacekeeping operations nor enforcement actions against
aggressors. Appropriate preparations, including training, earmarked
forces and predeployed equipment, have to be conceived and engaged.
Arguing that neither the United Nations Secretariat , nor Security
Council members have yet seriously undertaken to rethink
contingencies and requirements for UN peacekeeping under emergent
world conditions, Columbia University's John G. Ruggie admonished
in a recent Foreiqn Affairs commentary that the UN's failure to fully
understand and doctrinally adjust to the new circumstances surrounding
peacekeeping have "brought the world body to the point of outright
strategic failure." 7 At first imperative in UN reform, then, is to think
through and better conceptualize the Organization's peacekeeping role
under political-military conditions prevailing today.
At a more practical level, other UN reformers are today suggesting
that the UN needs to be better informed about volatile situations around
6 Emest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate : Politics of the U.N .. Congo
Operation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967),
passim . See also, The Blue Helmets , op. cit., pp. 215-259 .
7 John Gerard Ruggie, "The U.N.: Wandering in the Void, " Foreign
Affairs, 72:5 (November/December 1993), p . 26.
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the world and especially better informed about situations into which the
Organization is being asked to intervene. The Secretary-General's
access to timely information about brewing trouble needs to be greatly
improved The Secretariat's data-gathering and analysis capabilities need
to be improved and more directly linked to the Secretary-General's
Office. 8 No matter how strong the opposition from member states,
something resembling a UN diplomatic service, with representation and
reporting capabilities at permanent missions around the world needs to
be established.
The size of the UN professional staff managing peacemaking
missions and peacekeeping operations needs to be substantially
enlarged. Steps need to be taken to minimize, indeed to eliminate, the
ad hoc procedures typically followed in the assembling, dispatching and
deploying of blue-helmeted military forces. Some appropriately trained
and quickly deployable UN forces should be permanently established.
Other appropriately trained peacekeeping units should be continually
available in the military forces of member states and held ready for UN
service.
Policies should be formulated that guarantee that UN
peacekeepers are appropriately armed for their assigned missions, and
rules of engagement should be set down which actually allow the UN to
show force when contingencies require. 9 There is considerable, and
understandable, concern among member governments about giving the
UN its own military forces. But, if the Organization is going to be
repeatedly asked to place young men and women in harm's way, the
international community must see to it that its peacekeeping
interventions are of the highest professional military quality, even if
this involves establishing a United Nations army.
Needless to say, the UN's unique capacity for conducting
peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in the post-Cold War world
depends crucially upon the abilitiy of the members of the Security
Council, especially the Permanent Five, to continue to find consensus.
For the time being at least, none of the major powers appears interested
in fomenting or abetting regional or national conflicts, in letting these
escalate, or in intervening unilaterally to control them. Indeed, each of
8 Connie Peck, "Preventive Diplomacy:
A Perspective for the 1990s, "
Occasional Papers Series, Number XIII (New York: The Ralph Bunche
Institute on the United Nations, February 1993), pp. 6-13; George L.
Sherry, "The United Nations Reborn: Conflict Control in the Post -Cold
War World, " Critical Issues 90.2 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
1990), p. 27.
9Edward C. Luck, "Steps Toward UN Reform," internal memorandum,
United Nations Association of the United States, New York, March 19,
1993, p. 4; See also, United States Commission on Improving the
Effectiveness of the United Nations , Defining Purpose : The U.N. and the
Health of Nations (Washington: September, 1993), pp . 20-2 1.
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the major powers appears lo favor the emerging muhipolar status quo,
which not only privileges them in diplomacy and commerce, but allows
them respite for attention to domestic affairs. Should the major power
consensus breakdown, however, the peacemaking capacity of the United
Nations would be greatly diminished and the Organization's
peacekeeping capacity would all but vanish. The results would be
similar, incidentally, if the UN goes bankrupt: the financing of UN
peacekeeping activities, along with the general financing of the
organization urgently require top-to-bottom overhaul. 10

Development

via Diplomacy?

Positively speaking, most of the reforms required to render the
United Nations a more effective peacekeeper in the post-Cold War
world , are accomplishable. The costs and threats of emergent disorder
could very well impel the international community to progressively
enhance the UN's peacekeeping capacities in coming years, in the
course of which the needed reforms would be set in place. However, as
orginally conceived and as written into the Charter, the UN was to
function not only as peacemaker and peacekeeper, but also as peace builder. The Organization was supposed to foster and nurture human
conditions that contributed to peace by eliminating the scarcities,
inequities and injustices that people have been historically prone to
fight about. To its credit, the United Nations contributed pivotally to
eliminating colonialism and the injustice that this practice both
symbolized and perpetrated. 11 But, the Organization over several
decades has accomplished precious little toward enhancing the material
well-being of the poverty-engulfed peoples of the post-colonial world.
While it is true that the United Nations has been able to mobilize
humanitarian assistance in crisis situations, it is nonetheless difficult to
find much positive UN influence in the area of development however
this term is defined. Economic growth accompanied by enhanced
human well-being has occurred in recent decades, particularly in Asia
and some parts of Latin America. But the reasons for this growth
hardly have lo do with the UN. Il could even be argued that for some
countries, like the Republic of China, South Korea and Singapore,
economic development followed from pursuing policies that not only
shunned UN assistance , but outrightly rejected the prevailing doctrines
of the United Nations developers. It would appear therefore that if the
UN has comparative programmatic advantage anywhere, this advantage
is surely not in the realm of development.
10 Independent Advisory Group on U .N . Financing, Finan cing an
Effective United Nations (Ford Foundation: New York, 1993), pp . 14-21.
11 David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), passim.

136 I The Journal of Political Science

The U.N. and the Challenge of the Post-Cold War World
Explaining the United Nation's failure as a development institution
is involved. Surely, the deeply underlying reason for its unimpressive
record is the combination of intellectual arrogance and prevailing
ignorance that has plagued Development Economics in particular, and
development theorizing in general for forty years. 12 How to promote
human betterment via social and economic change, is not very well
understood, and policies to promote it have therefore rested on the
weakest of intellectual foundations. The UN bought into development
theorizing, or "development sloganizing," early on, and recanted,
recouped and redirected itself every time a prevailing sloganized theory -e.g., take-off, import subtitution, trade not aid, trickle down, basic
human needs, marketization, sustainable development -- was discredited
and replaced by a new one. All of the other development agencies did
the same, with the same disappointing results.
Beyond intellectual weakness at the foundation, a central theme in
explaining the UN's particular shortcomings as a development
institution is that the intergovernmental character of the Organization
has weighed heavily against its ability to conceptualize, map and lead
down pathways toward human material betterment. For one thing,
governments politicize issues, even highly technical ones, and
international organizations that include cold-warring governments
among their members tend to polarize ideologically. This was certainly
the case within the United Nations concerning East-West issues during
the American-Soviet contest. It has been just as surely the case
concerning North-South issues during the colonial-anti-colonial
struggles and with all that has followed in their wake . The NorthSouth Cold War continues; indeed it is probably just beginning as a
world historic phenomenon and will go on until the contending
ideologies are rendered obsolete by material conditions. The contest is
about fundamental philosophical differences between the West and the
non-West, having to do among other things with differing conceptions
of society and individuals ' roles. 13 It is also about deeply contrasting
interpretations of history, about preferences in political economy, about
differing conceptions of justice and about race . It has prevented the
United Nations from meaningfully defining "development," from
formulating workable strategies to promote it and from mobilizing
resources to execute strategies. 14

12 See

the symposium issue of Development magazine , particularly
contributions by Mahbub Ul Haq, Manfred Max -Neef and Maurice Strong .
Development, 2/3, 1988.
13
K.ishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest," The National Interest,
28 (Summer, 1992), pp. 3-13.
14Majid Rahnema, "Under the Banner of Development ," Development,
1/2 (1986), pp . 37-46 .
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As a result, the intergovernmental relations of economic and social
development, largely acted out in the UN, have been much more in the
nature of debates aimed at fixing blame and scoring rhetorical points
rather than about concrete projects and programmes aimed at uplifting
destitute people. Though unproductive, the development debate among
governments goes on: the industrialized capitalist countries of the North
imagine that "development" must mean striving to become like them;
the poorer countries of the South insist that "development" must mean
striving to rid themselves of dependence on the North so that they need
not become like them but might instead preserve their non-Western
cultural identities. Within the UN in particular, the North-South debate
over development has been largely about controlling the development
discourse, which is to say, determining the way development is to be
thought about and spoken about, which of course makes all the
difference in determining what ought or ought not to be done about it!
The main outcome has been that people's actual needs have been
ignored by the debating governments, both North and South. "Forty
years of 'development' assistance by international institutions , including
the United Nations System," Rahnema explains,
have shown that , despite attempts to adapt
development theories and practices to the real needs of
populations concerned, these institutions seem
organically unable --and often unwilJing -- to change
their . . . approach . Problems are seldom perceived or
addressed according to the way the peoples themselves
view their needs and aspirations . 'Priorities' and
'strategies' are set independently by planners with
their own pre-defined objectives . In reality, they have
little to do with the way the people have lived, are
living, wish to live. 15
In addition to the ideological barriers that cloud communication
among governments and block meaningful cooperation , there are also
practical reasons why intergovernmental diplomacy cannot contribute
very much to social and economic development. It is not entirely
surprising that the diplomacy of development has produced much more
in the way of slogans, conferences , committees, studies, reports,
resolutions and declarations, than poor people's lives changed for the
better.
For on e thing, the technical sophistication of many
development issues usually requires expertise beyond that typically
possessed by diplomats , inputs beyond those which foreign ministries
can provid e, and calculations other than those which normaJiy go into
15Ibid., p.

41.
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traditional assessments of national interest. It is also sadly the case that
any number of governments, in both rich and poor countries, give
highest political and economic priority to objectives other than
improving the quality of poor people's lives in the non-western world.
For these regimes, the rituals of development diplomacy, particularly in
the UN, conveniently sham largely fictitious commitments. "The
practices and the rituals,"
. . . constitute the fragile foundations necessary both
to maintain the fictions and to serve as useful devices
for finding temporary solutions to otherwise basic
contradictions.
They are guarantees that the
U.N.system remains,after all, the club which different
Member States want it to be. 16
Consultative and negotiating processes concerning social and
economic development frequently must involve non-governmental and
transnational actors who have no formal role in state-to-state diplomacy
and no formal status in traditional intergovernmental organizations.
Non-governmental organizations, constituted at all levels from local to
transnational, are today the custodians of vast stores of experiential
wisdom concerning social and economic change in non-Western areas .
They are also primary agents of development (if we define it as
enhanced human well-being) because they are almost uniquely capable
of reaching people whose lives are to be affected by social and economic
change. 17 They are also almost uniquely capable of transmitting
grassroots conceptualizations and aspirations. Yet, non-governmental
organizations remain outside the intergovernmental nexus that generates
the development policies and programmes of the United Nations. Both
symbolically and often quite literally, they set their tents outside the
great meeting halls where the world conferences are held. From there
they lobby , criticize, prod and provoke . Some even pray!
Governments may listen to NGOs. Some do. But the diplomacy of
development is structured in such as way that governments can choose
to ignore the NGOs. Many do.
To be sure, in attempting to implement development programmes,
the UN must and does deal with non-governmental actors, but it is
greatly constrained in so doing because national governments resist.
Although logical, and certainly expeditious , it is very difficult (and
illegal under the Charter) for the United Nations , in either seeking
information or delivering services, to circumvent national governments
and deal directly with NGOs in the field. This is particularly true with
16 Ibid .,

p. 45 .
F. Carroll, Intermediary NGOS : The Supporting Links in
Grassroots Development (Hartford, Conn .: Kumarian Press, 1992), passim.
17 Thomas
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regard to local NGOs. Governments typically resist relinguishing
control over activities taking place within their sovereign jurisdictions,
and therefore often look with suspicion upon UN attempts to reach
people. Passing through national governments, either from the
grassroots upwards or from the United Nations downwards, can be
highly frustrating, especially in instances where particular NGOs or
their policies and practices are not officially favored by national
governments. A considerable amount of UN field activity actually
proceeds in circumvention of national governments, but having to go
around governments is hardly an efficient way to promote development.
Any number of reform schemes aimed at making the United
Nations into a more effective development organization have been
suggested. Revamping the Economic and Social Council to render it
more of a clearing house for development plans and programmes and
more of a UN system-wide coordinator of development undertakings is
possible. Creating an official organ in the United Nations system to
seat NGOs and thereby make the UN into something more than an
intergovernmental organization is interesting. Concentrating UN
development activities in the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund is plausible. Spinning off development activities to the
specialized agencies is also conceivable. Ultimately, however, anything
more than a cosmetic, and hence inconsequential, reform of the UN as a
development institution necessarily must involve fundamentally
altering the intergovernmental character of the Organization . This is
more fanciful than feasible.
The United Nations

and Globalistic

Fictions

Commenting on the deliberative proceedings of one of the UN's
specialized agencies , a Geneva-based diplomat interviewed in 1989
remarked that "they think they are making global policies, but none of
this has any effect on people. " In context his statement referred to the
fact that relatively few national governments actually enforce UN
policies contained in assumedly universally applicable resolutions.
Yet, beyond the issue of political will there is the issue of universality
itself . One of things that the UN does, indeed what it has been doing
for quite some time, is to make global policies . Such policies
purportedly speak to conditions and problems facing mankind as a
species, or the international community as a social unit, or possibly the
international community as a legal entity. But the unities addressed in
the UN's global policy-making are mostly fictitious. Humanity is a
diverse lot: there is no international "community" by any conventional
definition of the term . There are only "communities" -- national
communities , religious communities, cultural communities, linguistic
communities, economic communities . Much of the mythology of
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globalism, and of UN global policy-making, has denied the
fragmentation of mankind because globalists aspire to overcome it.
Furthermore, much that has come under the rubric of promoting
globalism, and accordingly much of the content of UN global policymaking, has been in reality a series of efforts to universalize Western
values, practices and institutions. 18
It is true that five hundred years of European cultural ascendance
and political, economic and military dominance, have spread a veneer of
westerness over mankind. 19 It is also true that Western governments
and peoples have used international organizations like the United
Nations to thicken this veneer because it has been much to the western
advantage to do so. Hence, international legality is based on Western
customs, norms and practices; human rights are Western rights born
during Europe's 18th Century Enlightenment and institutionalized as a
result of the American and French Revolutions; modernization and the
development that leads to it mean becoming socially and economically
like the West; democratization means establishing Western-stlye
democracy. "Civilization" means Western civilization which can be
attained by abandoning all manner of non-Western barbarisms and
backwardness, and the policies of international organizations, insofar as
Western powers influence them, should be directed toward suppressing
these "uncivilized" conditions.20
As we approach the 21st Century, it is beginning to appear as if
the outward diffusion of Western civilization may have run its course.
Decolonization was the initial political reaction against Western
hegemony, but the inevitable cultural reaction was postponed by the
ideological conformities demanded during the Cold War. With the end
of the Cold War has come the opening phase of non-Western cultural
reassertiveness, exhibited in phenomena like Islamic Fundamentalism,
Hindu communalism, East Asian authoritarian developmentalism and
Chinese cultural self-assuredness. 21 The Russian parliamentary
elections of December, 1993 exhibited a pronounced resurfacing of
culturally embedded, historically familiar, Westernphobic Russian
orientalism. At the Vienna Conference on Human Rights during the
summer of 1993, China and the Islamic countries rebutted Western
18 Rahnema, op. cit., 38-41.
19Theodore H. Von Laue, The

World Revolution of Westernization (New
York : Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 11-50.
20 Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An
Essay on Method," in Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International
Relations , Stephen Gill (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), pp . 58 -64; Cox, "Structural Issues of Global Governance :
Implications for Europe," in Gill (ed.), pp. 264-276 .
21 Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs,
72:3 (Summ er, 1993), pp . 22-49.
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notions about the universality of its historic principals by insisting
upon the cultural relativity of human rights. This exchange between
the West and the non-West was serious, and it should be read as a
harbinger of many inter-cultural clashes to come. What these coming
cultural contests will mean is that neither the West nor the United
Nations is going to do very well at trying to preserve the myth of an
international community, nor will there be much to be gained by
promoting globalism as an ideology because it will ring hollow in the
absence of confirming conditions.
Philosophical issues aside, there is also a certain unreality in
putting forth global policies to address issues and problems that are best
addressed communally. Human rights issues, as noted, might be most
productively sorted within cultural communities, as might questions
about the appropriateness of particular social and political practices and
institutions. There are no agreed universal values and designs about
these matters. Why should there be? Issues of development and
modernization also might actually be better handled within cultural
communities instead according to universal models, standards and
attributed aspirations. Why does "modernization" have to mean
becoming like the West? Each of the great cultures developed life
support algorithms that sustained countless generations. Why cannot
"development" and "modernization" mean improving upon these?
For other kinds of issues the most appropriate locus of problemdefining and problem-solving activity, and the most suitable theater for
international cooperation is the geographic region. The geography of
human settlement being what it is, geographic regions and cultural
communities regularly overlap. Most of the most volatile security
issues in the post-Cold War world are regional, not global. The danger
of a global conflagration is lower today than at any time in the last
century and this condition is likely to persist until well into the next
century. Today, therefore, the appropriate conflict-resolving (and
peacekeeping) forums of first resort ought to be regional international
organizations. Logically, United Nations peacemaking and peacekeeping
ought to backstop regional efforts . Presently, very few regional
organizations actually act as conflict-preventers or conflict-resolvers,
and those that occasionally do, like the Organization of African Unity,
the Arab League, the Organization of American States, and the newly
ambitious Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have not
been very successful. The capacitie s of these organizations surely
should be enhanced.
Environmental problems are also more regional than global, and
indeed the worst cases of pollution are national and local. ILis no doubt
good for the conscience, and certainly good for the media and those who
wish Lobe exposed by them, to hold international conclaves with casts
of thousands aimed at protesting the despoiling of the earth. Nor is
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there anything wrong with mobilizing commitments to do something
about the beleaguered ecosystem.
The Rio Conference on the
environment was the UN's grandest extravaganza, and its organizers
deserve credit for making it happen.
But, how many of mankind's environmental woes are actually
global? There are a few such problems to be sure. The greenhouse
phenomenon, if indeed there really is one, is everybody's problem with
regard to both causes and effects. The same can be said with regard to
the hole in the earth's ozone layer. But stopping the browning of the
blue Danube is a central European problem, and halting the similar
sliming of great rivers around the world are problems for regional
riparian neighbors. Cleaning the cesspool that the Mediterranean Sea
has become is a problem for the littoral countries; halting the washing
of East Africa's topsoil into the Indian Ocean is an East African
problem; combating desertification in sub-Saharan Africa is a subSaharan African problem; preventing acid rain is a North American and
North European problem; freshening polluted air in Mexico City and
Beijing are Mexican and Chinese problems respectively; removing the
debris floating in Boston's harbor is Boston's problem. The point here
is not that those of us not directly affected should ignore these many
problems. It is rather that those of us not directly affected cannot do
very much about solving most of the problems. Neither can the United
Nations at the lofty level of global policy-making do very much. The
United Nations can pontificate about perils to the planet Earth, and it
can even set down global action plans and establish global goals and
standards for environmental purification. It can insist that development
must be environmentally "sustainable." But the cooperation required to
deal with environmental perils is not global; it is rather regional among
affected countries, national among affected communities and local
among affected individuals.
There is no need to further belabor the non-globalness of human
affairs. What was said about the regional loci of security issues, and
the regional and national loci of most environmental problems, could
also be said with regard to issues having to do with ethnic and religious
minorities, with migration and refugees, food and agriculture, and
increasingly even with international trade . Different countries and
peoples inhabiting different regions of the planet have different kinds of
problems and different ways of solving them. At the level of grand
rhetoric much can be cast in generic terms, and regional and local
problems can be conceived as variants of global ones. But on the
ground, where the problem-solving has to take place, universalistic
descriptions and prescriptions tend not to be terribly helpful. During an
interview in 1989 dealing with stratgies for economic development, a
diplomat from Thailand explained what his country was doing to
generate capital, but he cautioned against generalizing from the Thai
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experience by concluding: "you must remember, Thailand is not
Africa!"
To return to relevance in our part of this century and on into the
next, the United Nations needs to dispense with myths of universality
and abandon the globalistic ideology that drives its policy-making. It
needs to institutionalize cultural diversity rather than moving to
supersede it. It most assuredly needs to avoid promoting Westernism
under the rubrics of development, modernization, human rights and
democracy. The United Nations has to be a place where the cultural
communities of the world can come together to communicate with and
learn from one another; it can no longer be a place where cultural
communities come together to homogenize or hegemonize. Ideally, the
UN should evolve into a place where ground rules for peaceful intercultural relations can be formulated, just as it has been a place where
ground rules for peaceful inter-state relations were formulated.
The UN must decentralize, indeed de-globalize. This could very
well mean withdrawing completely from problem areas and policy
realms where globalistic solutions do not apply. Or, it could mean
regionalizing all programmes where diversities render globalistic
approaches inept, and devolving considerable autonomy and authority to
regional UN institutions and their managers. Better still would be a
sweeping effort by governments to regionalize their approaches and in
so doing either strengthen existing regional international organizations
or establish new ones as needed . In any event, the problem solvers
must be brought closer to the problems, or else international
cooperation will have an unpromising future.
Reforming

the United Nations

We hear so often today that "if the United Nations did not exist,
world conditions would demand that it be created." To be sure, the
United Nations organization is essential in the post-cold war world.
But, were we to create the United Nations today, it is doubtful that we
would re-establish the organization that was chartered in 1945, because
such an organization would be of limited use under present-day
conditions. It is also doubtful that we would actually be able to charter
a new world organization today because intensifying West-Non-West
differences would foreclose international consensus concerning the
structure, mission and functioning of such a body. A new Charter
would never emerge. Fortunately, we do not have to create a new world
organization for the 1990s and beyond, but we do desperately need to
reform the one we have.
The thrust of the arguments in this essay suggests that reforming
the UN to make it relevant in the context of contemporary conditions
will require substantial changes. The logic of comparative institutional
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advantage recommends that what the UN can do singularly well should
be kept in the reformed body as long as the activity in question serves a
useful international purpose. But what the UN does poorly or what
other agencies can do better should be kept out of the reformed body.
What the UN does that is of little use, no matter how well or poorly it
does it, should also be kept out.
First, the peacemaking and peacekeeping functions of the United
Nations should be retained and emphasized. A UN reformed to fit the
contexts of the 1990s and beyond should be primarily a peacemaking
and peacekeeping organization. Everything possible therefore should be
done to enhance the organization's capacities to act under both Chapter
VI and Chapter VII of the Charter. This includes, as recommended
above, the establishment of a standing United Nations army, sized and
armed to intervene quickly and decisively to quell threats to peace
arising from both international and intra-national conflicts. Additional
mechanisms should be created to make it possible for the United
Nations to cooperate more widely and effectively with regional
organizations on matters of peacemaking and peacekeeping. When
peace is imperiled in regions, the UN should intervene only after
regional agencies have failed or appear likely to fail or when they ask
for assistance. If preserving the consensus that makes UN peacemaking
and peacekeeping possible requires that the Security Council be
restructured to better represent the international distribution of power
and influence, then the Security Council should be restructured without
delay. At the very least, Japan and Germany should become permanent
members of the Security Council, and a way should be found to keep
regional powers like India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico,
nearly always on the Council.
Second, the United Nations should exit the development field. The
Organization's unimpressive record as a development institution, the
constraints of intergovernmentalism, the North-South new cold war
context of world politics and the availability of other more promising
agents all recommend that the UN should relinguish its development
m1ss1on. The entire multi-lateral development effort should be
decentralized--communalized culturally and regionalized geographically
and financially. To the extent possible institutional contexts should be
created that avoid North-South or West-Non-West politicization, which
means, practically speaking, keeping the West out of development
issues and institutions. There are many meanings to development;
peoples must be empowered to define it and pursue it as best suits their
needs and heritages. Institutional contexts should also be created that
better integrate governmental and non-governmental wisdom and action:
NGOs should be the moving forces for development.
Third, to the extent that it implies supranational or transcultural
community, or aspirations to create such communities, globalism
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should be abandoned as the UN's operating ideology . This is not
because globalism is necessarily philosophically flawed, but rather
because it is fanciful under prevailing world conditions. Instead of
promoting globalism in a world of proliferating diversity, the United
Nations might much more usefully take diversity as the great given of
our time and promote inter-cultural communication, toleration and
learning. Ironically , the only organ of the United Nations system
principally dedicated to doing this is UNESCO, and that agency is today
in a state of disarray. UNESCO desperately needs to be revitalized.
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